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Abstract—There are various reader/tag authentication proto-
cols proposed for the security of RFID systems. Such a protocol
normally contains several rounds of conversations between a
tag and a reader and involves cryptographic operations at both
reader and tag sides. Currently there is a lack of benchmarks
that provide a fair comparison platform for (a) the time cost
of cryptographic operations at the tag side and (b) the time
cost of data exchange between a reader and a tag, making
it impossible to evaluate the total time cost for executing a
protocol. Based on our experiments implemented on IAIK UHF
tag emulators (known as DemoTags), in this paper we present
detailed benchmarks of both time costs for RFID authentication
protocols. Our results reveal that the data exchange dominates
the time cost for running a protocol. We also give a classification
for the existing protocols and summarise formulae of time cost
evaluation for each type of protocols in a way so that a user can
evaluate the time cost of a protocol amongst several choices of
cryptographic operations in an application.
I. INTRODUCTION
The RFID (radio frequency identification) technology has
been envisioned to have significant impact on the economy
world-wide as an inevitable replacement of barcodes in the
near future [1]. One of its most promising applications is
supply chain management [2], [3], in which RFID tags are
attached to products so that they can be conveniently identified
by tag readers. An RFID applications may encounter insecure
situations like duplication of tag IDs, invalid or counterfeit tags
and readers, or other malicious attacks. Therefore, in practice it
is critical to have solutions that can authenticate the legitimacy
of tags and readers. Aiming at this purpose, various reader/tag
authentication protocols [4]–[8] are proposed to enhance the
system security, reliability, and robustness. Such a protocol
normally contains several rounds of conversations between a
tag and a reader and involves cryptographic [4], [5] operations
at both reader and tag sides. Different cryptographic operations
adopted by a protocol may generate different timing overhead
when executing the protocol.
In general, the time cost of an authentication protocol,
as one of the critical concerns in real applications, consists
of three parts, namely (1) the time cost for cryptographic
operations and looking up a database at the reader side1,
1The cryptographic operations and looking up a database are actually
carried out by the server to which the reader is connected. Thus the reader
side is also referred to as the server side because the reader serves as the
system interface to interact with tags.
denoted as Tr, (2) the time cost for cryptographic operations
at the tag side, denoted as Tt, and (3) the time cost of data
exchange between a reader and a tag, denoted as Tc. The
speed comparison for cryptographic operations [9] provides a
benchmark for the first part of time cost Tr though, currently
there is a lack of benchmarks for the latter two parts of time
costs Tt and Tc, making it impossible to evaluate the time
cost of a protocol amongst difference choices of cryptographic
operations.
The difficulty of time cost evaluation for an authentication
protocol motivates us to study on the time costs Tt and
Tc. In this paper, we conduct comprehensive experiments to
test the time costs Tt (running cryptographic operations) and
Tc (data exchange between a reader and a tag) based on
IAIK UHF tag emulators [10] which follow ISO 18000-6C
standard [11], [12] and work as C1G2 passive RFID tags. The
cryptographic operations in our study include MD5, SHA-1,
SHA-256, SHA-512, AES-128, AES-192, AES-256, and an
ultra-lightweight block cipher PRESENT-80 [13], all of which
are commonly adopted by authentication protocols [5], [6],
[14]. Furthermore, we give a classification for the existing
authentication protocols, and summarise a time cost formula
for each type of protocols based on the benchmarks of time
costs resulting from our experiments.
Our experimental results show that the latter two parts of
time costs Tt and Tc are the dominant components of the
total time cost for carrying out a protocol, and the first part
of time Tr is completely negligible. This is because both Tt
and Tc are on the order of ones to hundreds of milliseconds
as shown in the next; whereas Tr is below 0:13 millisecond
for running cryptographic operations2 and looking up 220 tags
in a database [7]. Furthermore, the results reveal that in most
cases over 95% of the total time cost for running a protocol
is spent on data exchange, whereas only less than 5% is spent
on running cryptographic operations, from which we conclude
that in most cases the time cost of data exchange Tc dominates
the total time cost for executing a protocol.
Our research results on the benchmarks and formulae pro-
vide a fair comparison reference for evaluating the time cost of
a protocol under several choices of cryptographic operations
2A single cryptographic operation can be carried out within 2 23 second
on a PC [7], [9].
in a real application, regardless whether the protocol is an
existing one that has been applied to real applications or is to
be proposed for certain application scenarios.
The remaining sections are organised as follows. In Sec-
tion II we present our experimental results for testing the time
costs of cryptographic operations and data exchange, following
which in Section III we give a classification for the existing
authentication protocols and summarise a formula of time cost
for each type of protocols. We then in Section IV review
the related work about authentication protocols based on the
classification before concluding the paper in Section V.
II. TIME COSTS OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS AND
DATA EXCHANGE
As aforementioned, the time cost for carrying out an au-
thentication protocol consists of three parts: (1) the time cost
at the reader side for running cryptographic operations and
looking up a database, denoted as Tr; (2) the time cost at the
tag side for running cryptographic operations, denoted as Tt;
and (3) the time cost for data exchange between a reader and a
tag, denoted as Tc. Data exchange includes sending challenges
from a reader to a tag and returning responses from a tag to
a reader.
Since time cost Tr is below 0.13 millisecond [7] and is
totally negligible as compared with the latter two parts of time
costs Tr and Tc which are on the order of ones to hundreds
of milliseconds as shown in the next, our experiments will
focus on the testing of Tr and Tc which are the dominant
components of the total time cost of a protocol. Aiming at
this goal, in what follows we conduct four sets of experiments:
(1) the first set of experiments will test the time cost for a tag
to run the following hashing operations: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-
256, and SHA-512; (2) the second set of experiments will test
the time cost for a tag to run the following encryption opera-
tions: AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256; (3) the third set of
experiments will test the time cost for a tag to run PRESENT-
80 which is an ultra-lightweight cipher block operation [13];
and (4) the fourth set of experiments will test the time cost of
data exchange, i.e, the time cost for a tag to read/write data
in its memory banks and the time for a reader to read/write
data in the memory banks of a tag.
A. Experimental Setup
The major components in our experimental setup consist of
tags and readers.We use two types of tags in our experiments,
namely (1) Philips UCODE UHF Gen2 RFID tags (in short as
Philips tags henceforth) and (2) IAIK UHF tag emulators [10],
a.k.a. DemoTags. DemoTags follow ISO 18000-6C standard
[11] and work as C1G2 (class-1 generation-2) passive RFID
tags, i.e., the electrical properties such as read/write speeds
are almost the same as normal commercial C1G2 tags like
Philips tags. A DemoTag is embedded with an ATMega128
micro-controller which is a low-power CMOS 8-bit micro-
controller at speed 16 MHz based on the AVR enhanced RISC
architecture. A DemoTag (actually the ATmega128 micro-
controller) has 128 KB of flash memory, 4 KB of runtime
TABLE I
INPUT BLOCK SIZE AND OUTPUT SIZE OF HASHING OPERATIONS (BYTES)
Hashing operation MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-512
n blocks input size 64n  9 64n  9 64n  9 128n  17
output size 16 20 32 64
TABLE II
TIME COST OF HASHING OPERATIONS (MILLISECONDS)
One block input (bytes) Two blocks input (bytes)
6 30 54 56 90 118
MD5 1:8 1:8 1:8 3:1 3:2 3:1
SHA-1 5:0 5:1 5:0 10:1 10:2 10:1
SHA-256 11:7 11:7 11:6 23:1 23:2 23:1
6 56 111 112 176 239
SHA-512 41:0 41:1 41:1 81:7 81:8 81:7
RAM, and 4 KB of non-volatile EEPROM memory. The
program of a cryptographic operation is stored in the flash
memory, while alterable data (such as EPC, challenge and
response) are stored in the EEPROM memory which serves as
memory banks of a tag. A DemoTag provides read and write
operations, allowing a program stored in the flash memory to
read or write one 16-bit word of alterable data in each time
of read/write operation.
The readers we use in our experiments are CAEN A828
readers [15] equipped with the commands that can read or
write several 16-bit words of data in a memory bank of a tag
(either a DemoTag or a Philips tag) in each time of read/write
operation. Readers are connected to a back-end server which
is an IBM T43 laptop PC running Microsoft Windows XP.
The programs running on a DemoTag for cryptographic
operations are written in C code on the development platform
of Rowley CrossWorks for AVR [16], while the programs
running on the server that coordinates a reader to read data
from or write data to a DemoTag’s EEPROM memory or a
Philips tag’s memory bank are written with Microsoft Visual
C++ 6.0.
B. Experimental Results
The experimental results shown in the next are the average
of the results collected from over 500 runs of each set of
experiments. Due to the stability of the devices we use (i.e.,
the readers and tags), the unsuccessful rates of reader to tag
read/write operations are below 1%.
(1) In the first set of experiments that test the running time
on a DemoTag for the hashing operations of MD5, SHA-1,
SHA-256, and SHA-512, we vary the length of input message
from one block to two blocks while in each block we take
three different input lengths.
Table I shows the input size of blocks and output size for
each of the hashing operations. For a given input message,
if its length is less than n blocks and greater than n   1
blocks (where n = 1; 2; : : : ), then the hashing operation will
cut the input message into n   1 blocks and do padding for
the last block, after which the hashing is carried out block by
block. For any length of input message, the output size (i.e.,
TABLE III
TIME COST OF RUNNING AES (MILLISECONDS)
AES-128 AES-192 AES-256
Encryption 2:8 3:3 4:3
Decryption 3:1 3:6 4:8
TABLE IV
TIME COST OF LIGHTWEIGHT CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION
(MILLISECONDS)
PRESENT-80 1:3
TABLE V
BLOCK SIZE OF AES AND PRESENT-80 (BYTES)
AES-128 AES-192 AES-256 PRESENT-80
16 16 16 8
the length of hash value) is the same for each of the hashing
operations as shown in Table I.
Table II shows the time cost of running hashing operations
with different input lengths. The result tells that the running
time of hashing operations increases proportionally with the
number of input blocks, but keeps constant if the input length
is within the same block size. The time cost of running SHA-1
is about 3 times as that of MD5, while the time cost of
running SHA-256 is over two times as that of SHA-1. Given
the doubled input block size of SHA-512, the time cost of
running SHA-512 is nearly 4 times as that of SHA-256.
(2) In the second set of experiments, we test the time cost for
a DemoTag to run encryption operations AES-128, AES-192,
and AES-256. With respective 128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit
key sizes, these three block ciphers have the same 16 bytes
of input block length. As shown in Table III, the results tell
that the time costs of AES-256 and AES-192 are respectively
about 20% and 40% more than that of AES-128. This agrees
with the fact that AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 have
respectively 10, 12, and 14 rounds of calculations. Moreover,
AES decryption is a bit slower than encryption due to more
complex inverse operations.
(3) In the third set of experiments, we test the time cost for
a DemoTag to run PRESENT-80 which is an ultra-lightweight
block cipher well suitable for extremely constrained environ-
ments such as RFID tags and sensor networks [13]. As shown
in Table IV, it takes 1.3 ms to run PRESENT-80 with full-
round (31 rounds) encryption or decryption operation with 80-
bit key size and 8 bytes of input block length. This time cost
is nearly 30% less than that of MD5 under one block size of
input.
For the block ciphers studied above, namely AES-128, AES-
192, AES-256, and PRESENT-80, the input and output are the
same length (this length is known as the block size) as shown
in Table V. In practice, a protocol that contains cryptographic
operations can take any length of input and output. For
example, a protocol containing a SHA-1 hashing operation
may take 8 bytes as input and 4 out of 20 bytes of hashing
TABLE VI
TIME COST OF TAG TO TAG READ/WRITE (ONE 16-BIT WORD) OPERATION
(MILLISECONDS)
read 0:007
write 16:7
TABLE VII
TIME COST OF READER TO TAG READ/WRITE OPERATION (MILLISECONDS)
words 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
read 46:9 46:9 46:9 47:0 47:1 47:1 47:3
write 63:3 82:9 103:2 124:1 142:3 162:3 183:5
words 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
read 47:1 47:2 47:2 47:2 47:3 47:2 47:2
write 204:0 222:6 243:3 263:6 283:3 303:2 324:5
words 15 16
read 56:8 57:3
write 344:6 364:1
value (see Table I) as output; similarly, a protocol containing
an AES-128 encryption operation may take only 4 bytes as
input and allow padding before running encryption operation,
and take 4 out of 16 bytes of block size (see Table V) as
output. This implies that the time cost may vary with different
lengths of inputs (i.e., challenges from a reader to a tag) and
outputs (i.e., responses from a tag to a reader), which will be
investigated in detail by the next set of experiments.
(4) In the fourth set of experiments, we investigate (a) the
time cost for a tag to read/write data from its memory banks
(a.k.a. tag to tag read/write operation) and (b) the time cost
for a reader to read/write data in the memory banks of a tag
(a.k.a. reader to tag read/write operation).
DemoTags provide read and write commands that allow a
DemoTag to read from or write to any of its memory banks
only one 16-bit word of data in each read/write operation. The
experimental result as shown in Table VI tells that the time
cost is 0:007 ms for a tag to tag read operation and 16:7 ms
for a tag to tag write operation. This result reveals that the
time cost of such a read operation is completely negligible as
compared with that of a write operation.
The CAEN readers we use in our experiments provide read
and write commands that allow a reader to read from or write
to a memory bank of a tag (either a DemoTag or a Philips
tag) n 16-bit words of data (where n = 1; 2; : : : ) in each of
its read/write operation. In the experiments, we let a CAEN
reader read the user memory bank of a DemoTag and a Philips
tag. There are 16 words of memory space in the user memory
bank of a DemoTag, and 14 words of memory space in the
user memory bank a Philips tag. We increase the number of
words accessed by a reader one by one.
The time costs of read/write operation on DemoTag’s user
memory bank are shown in Table VII, which tells that (a) the
time cost of a read operation keeps stable at around 47 ms for
reading of one to 14 words, and jumps to 56:8 ms at reading
of 15 words and tends to increases linearly but slightly with
an increment of around 0:5 ms for reading of 16 words; and
(b) writing a single word takes nearly 63 ms which is about
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Fig. 1. Time cost of reader to tag read/write operations
four times of a tag to tag write operation, and the time cost
increases linearly with the number of words at an increment
of about 20 ms.
Figure 1 gives a comparison of the time costs of read/write
operations for both types of tags, in which Figure 1(a) shows
that the time costs of read operation are the same (i.e., at
around 47 ms) for both tags in reading the first 14 words;
while Figures 1(b) shows that the time cost of write operation
on Philips tags, which increases linearly with the number of
words at an increment of about 15 ms, is slightly less than
that on DemoTags.
III. PROTOCOL CLASSIFICATION AND TIME COST
EVALUATION
In what follows, we give a classification for the existing
protocols and summarise a formula of time cost evaluation
for each type of authentication protocols. With the above
benchmarks of time costs, we give several examples of time
cost evaluation for some protocols based on the formulae.
From the examples and the benchmarks, we conclude that the
time cost for carrying out a protocol is mainly determined
by the time cost of data exchange which is the dominant
component of the total time cost.
A. Classification of Reader/Tag Authentication Protocols
A typical reader/tag authentication protocol works by two
phases, namely, a tag identification phase followed by an
authentication phase [6], [17], [18]. There are many reader/tag
1. Tag    Reader: c1
if (c1 is correct) then accept the reader
else reject the reader
(a) RAO protocols
1. Reader  ! Tag: c1
2. Reader    Tag: R(c1)
3. Server    Reader: R(c1)
if (R(c1) is correct) then accept the tag
else reject the tag
(b) TAO protocols
1. Reader  ! Tag: c1
2. Reader    Tag: R(c1)
3. Server    Reader: R(c1)
if (R(c1) is correct) then accept the tag
else reject the tag and abort
4. Tag    Reader: c2
if (c2 is correct) then accept the reader
else reject the reader
(c) TRA protocols
1. Tag    Reader: c1
if (c1 is correct) then accept the reader
else reject the reader and abort
2. Reader    Tag: R(c1)
3. Server    Reader: R(c1)
if (R(c1) is correct) then accept the tag
else reject the tag
(d) RTA protocols
Fig. 2. Illustration of simplified four types of authentication protocols
authentication protocols with different rounds of conversations
in the authentication phase though, the tag identification phase
is the same amongst all. If we ignore the tag identification
phase which includes the anti-collision procedure and inven-
tory command, the existing reader/tag authentication protocols
can be classified into four types based on the conversations
(between a reader and a tag) in their authentication phases.
They can be simplified as illustrated in Figure 2. The first two
types of protocols are one-way authentications, i.e., either a
tag authenticates itself to a reader or a reader authenticates
itself to a tag; whereas the latter two types of protocols are
mutual authentications by which tags and readers authenticate
to each other mutually. They are briefly described as follows.
(1) The first type is reader authentication protocols under
which only readers authenticate themselves to tags, referred to
as RAO (reader authentication only) as shown in Figure 2(a).
Challenge c1 sent by the reader is a function (such as a hashing
operation) of key k held by the tag. The tag runs the same
function with key k as the input and compares the result with
the received challenge c1. If c1 is equal to the result, i.e., c1 is
correct as illustrated in the figure, then it accepts the reader;
otherwise it rejects the reader. With hash-locking protocol [17]
as a representative, this type of protocols prevent unauthorised
readers from accessing tags.
(2) The second type is tag authentication protocols under
which only tags authenticate themselves to readers, referred
to as TAO (tag authentication only) as shown in Figure 2(b).
Upon receiving challenge c1 sent by the reader, the tag (of
which the legitimacy is unknown) returns response R(c1)
which is a function of challenge c1. The reader verifies the
correctness of R(c1) on the back-end server, and accepts
the tag if correct or rejects the tag otherwise. This type of
protocols allow readers to prevent unauthorised tags from
being accepted. Representatives of this type of protocols in-
clude Tsudik’s YA-TRAP [4] and five protocols of challenge-
response proposed by Vajda and Buttya´n [19].
(3) The third type of protocols such as the protocol of
Avoine et al. [7], the protocol of Yang et al. [20] and the
protocol of Molner and Wagner [8], referred to as TRA
(tag-then-reader authentication) in Figure 2(c), allow tags to
authenticate themselves to readers first followed by readers
authenticating themselves to tags. TRA protocols work as a
combination of TAO and RAO. The reader first sends a random
number c1 as the challenge and receives response R(c1), and
verifies its correctness on the back-end server. If correct, then
it accepts the tag and proceeds to authenticating itself to the
tag by sending another challenge c2; otherwise, it rejects the
tag and aborts the authentication process. Once the tag passes
the authentication to the reader, it verifies challenge c2. If it
is correct, then the tag accepts the reader; otherwise, it rejects
the reader.
(4) The fourth type of protocols such as the protocol of Alo-
mari et al. [6] and M2AP of Peris-Lopez et al. [14], referred to
as RTA (reader-then-tag authentication) in Figure 2(d), allow
readers to authenticate themselves to tags first and then tags
authenticate themselves to readers. Similar to TRA protocols,
RTA protocols work as a combination of RAO and TAO. The
difference is, under TRA protocols, the tag responds challenge
c1 without verifying its validity; whereas under RTA protocols,
the tag first verifies challenge c1 before responding with
response R(c1). If c1 is correct, then the tag accepts the reader;
otherwise, it rejects the reader and aborts the authentication.
Once the reader passes the authentication to the tag, it starts to
authenticate the tag by verifying the correctness of response
R(c1) on the back-end server. If correct, then it accepts the
tag; otherwise, it rejects the tag.
B. Formulae of Time Cost Evaluation
We are going to use some notations as shown in Table VIII
for the formulae of time cost evaluation. As mentioned in
the previous section, in general the time cost of the protocol
comprises of three parts as described by formula T = Tt +
Tr+Tc. We give a further explanation for terms Tt and Tc in
what follows.
(1) In our experiments, Tt the time cost of running crypto-
graphic operations at the tag side is actually comprised of two
TABLE VIII
NOTATIONS
T time cost of carrying out a protocol
Tr time cost of a cryptographic operation and looking up
a database at the reader side
Tt time cost of a cryptographic operation at the tag side
Tc time cost of data exchange between a reader and a tag
rt time cost of a tag to tag read operation for reading one word
wt time cost of a tag to tag write operation for writing one word
rn time cost of a reader to tag reader operation for reading n words
wn time cost of a reader to tag write operation for writing n words
n reader accessing n words of data from tag’s memory bank
parts, namely (a) the time cost of running the operations, and
(b) the time cost for a tag to read the input of a cryptographic
operation from it memory bank, denoted as m  rt where m is
the number of words it reads. An input is normally a challenge
(or part of a challenge) sent from a reader. From Table VI we
can see that, as compared with other operations, the time cost
of tag to tag read operation is below 0.01 millisecond and is
completely negligible. Normally the input is far less than 100
words, and Tt can be approximated by the first part of time
cost.
(2) The time cost of data exchange Tc contains two parts,
namely (a) the time cost that a reader sends challenges, which
is equivalent to reader to tag write operations, and (b) the time
cost that a tag returns responses. For C1G2 passive tags such
as DemoTags or Philips tags, due to their passiveness in data
exchange, returning a response is actually carried out by two
steps, namely (i) a tag first writes its result of a cryptographic
operation to one of its memory banks, and (ii) a reader reads
the result from tag’s memory bank. Thus returning a response
is equivalent to a tag to tag write operation followed by a
reader to tag read operation.
Considering that Tr is below 0:13 millisecond [7] and is
completely negligible as compared with Tt and Tc which are
on the order of ones to hundreds milliseconds as shown in
the previous section, the formula of the total time cost can be
simplified as follows:
T = Tt + Tc
With this simplified formula of time cost evaluation, we give
the detailed formula for each type of authentication protocols
in what follows based on the protocol classification.
(1) RAO protocols. This type of protocols contains (a) one
round of reader to tag write operation, which is corresponding
to sending challenge c1 to the tag as shown by step 1 in
Figure 2(a), and (b) a cryptographic operation at the tag side.
Normally challenge c1 is f(x) the result of a cryptographic
operation with input x, in which x is the secret key k held
by the tag3 [8], [14], [17]. To authenticate the legitimacy of
a reader, a tag runs the same cryptographic operation with
input x, and compares the result with f(x) it receives as
challenge c1. The formula of time cost is given as follows:
T = wn + Tt (1)
3It is possible that x is a concatenation of a random number r with key k,
and correspondingly challenge c1 is the concatenation of r and f(x).
in which n is the number of words in challenge c1.
(2) TAO protocols. This type of protocols contains (a) one
round of reader to tag write operation, which is corresponding
to sending challenge c1 as shown by step 1 in Figure 2(b), (b) a
cryptographic operation at the tag side, which is corresponding
to tag’s calculating response R(c1), and (c) one round of tag
to tag write operation followed by one round of reader to tag
read operation, which is corresponding to returning response
R(c1) as shown by step 2 in Figure 2(b). Here the challenge
c1 could be a random number, and the response R(c1) is the
cryptographic result f(c1; k) with inputs c1 and the secret key
k that the tag holds [4], [5], [19]. The formula is given as
follows:
T = wn + Tt +m  wt + rm (2)
in which n is the number of words in challenge c1 and m the
number of words in the cryptographic result f(c1; k).
(3) TRA protocols. This type of protocols is a combi-
nation of the previous two types of protocols. It contains
(a) two rounds of reader to tag write operation, which are
corresponding to reader’s sending challenges c1 and c2 as
shown by steps 1 and 2 in Figure 2(c), (b) two cryptographic
operations at the tag side, which are corresponding to tag’s
calculating R(c1) and verifying c2 as shown by steps 2 and 4
in Figure 2(c), and (c) one round of tag to tag write operation
followed by one round of reader to tag read operation, which
is corresponding to returning response R(c1) as shown by step
2 in Figure 2(c). In the process of data exchange, challenge c1
could be a random number, whereas challenge c2 is the result
of a cryptographic operation f(x) with input x. The formula
is given as follows:
T = wn1 + Tt +m  wt + rm + wn2 + T 0t (3)
in which Tt is the time cost of generating response R(c1),
T 0t the time cost of running f(x), n1 the number of words in
challenge c1, m the number of words in response R(c1), and
n2 the number of words in challenge c2.
(4) RTA protocols. As another combination of RTO and
TRO protocols, this type of protocols contains (a) one round
of reader to tag write operation, which is corresponding to
sending challenge c1 as shown by step 1 in Figure 2(d),
(b) two cryptographic operations at the tag side, which are
corresponding to tag’s verifying challenge c1 and calculating
response R(c1) as shown by steps 1 and 2 in Figure 2(d), and
(c) one round of tag to tag write operation followed by one
round of reader to tag read operations, which is corresponding
to returning response R(c1) as shown by step 2 in Figure 2(d).
In the protocol, challenge c1 is the result of a cryptographic
operation f(x) with inputs x. The formula is given as follows:
T = wn + Tt + T
0
t +m  wt + rm (4)
in which Tt is the time cost of running a cryptographic
operation with input x, T 0t the time cost of generating response
R(c1) which is the result of another cryptographic operation
with input c1 and secret key k, n the number of words in
challenge c1, and m the number of words in response R(c1).
TABLE IX
TIME COST OF DATA EXCHANGE Tc WITH DIFFERENT LENGTHS OF
CHALLENGE/RESPONSE (MS)
length RAO TRO TRA RTA
1 word 63:3 126:9 190:2 126:9
4 words 124:1 237:9 362:0 237:9
8 words 204:0 384:7 588:7 384:7
10 words 243:3 457:5 700:8 457:5
12 words 283:3 531:0 814:3 531:0
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Fig. 3. Ratio of time cost of data exchange vs. total time cost of carrying
out a protocol
C. Example of Time Cost Evaluation
If we just consider the time cost of data exchange Tc and
assume the same length of input and output (i.e., challenge and
response equivalently), then we can extract Tc from Formulae
(1) to (4) as shown below:
RAO : Tc = wn
TAO : Tc = wn + rn + n  wt
TRA : Tc = 2wn + rn + n  wt
RTA : Tc = wn + rn + n  wt
from which we get a set of values of Tc with various length
of input or output as shown in Table IX. The data in the table
shows that the time cost of data exchange Tc increases with
the length of input or output. Specifically, the second line of
Table IX, in which the input or output size is one word, shows
the lower bound of the time cost of data exchange time Tc.
If we let the input and output take the full block size
for AES and PRESENT-80 encryption operations and MD5
hashing operation, i.e., 8 words for AES and MD5, and 4
words for PRESENT-80, and take 8 words as input and 8
words as part of output size for SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-
512 hashing operations, then by looking up Tables II to IV,
based on Formulae (1) to (4) we get the ratio of the time
cost of data exchange Tc vs. the total time cost of a protocol
T as shows in Figure 3. From the figure, we can draw the
following conclusions: (a) in most cases over 95% of the total
time cost for running a protocol are spent on data exchange,
whereas only less than 5% are spent on running cryptographic
operations. Even for the worst case of SHA-512, the time
cost of data exchange takes over 80% of the total time cost,
(b) the ratio drops with the increase of time cost for running a
cryptographic operation, i.e., the ratio drops from PRESENT-
80 to AES-256 and from MD5 to SHA-512, and (c) with the
data shown in Table IX, we can further conclude that the ratio
will increases with the length of input or output. Therefore,
the above results reveal that in most cases the time cost of
data exchange Tc completely dominates the total time cost for
running a protocol.
In real applications, the cryptographic operations are nor-
mally implemented with circuits of logic gates and hence the
time cost of running such an operation is estimated faster
(say 2 to 10 times faster) than our software implementation4.
Meanwhile, it is possible to increase the speed of read/write
operations at most several times based on ISO standard
for C1G2 tags. However, these would further increase the
percentage of data exchange time out of the total time cost
for executing a protocol. Therefore, our study reveals that the
key to reduce the total time cost of running a protocol is to
minimise the length of inputs and outputs and to cut off the
rounds of data exchange.
IV. RELATED WORK
There are many papers that theoretically discuss the imple-
mentation of authentication protocols or calculate the number
of logic gates and time cost for implementation. For example,
Avoine et al. proposed a solution which greatly reduces the
time of looking up a database to authenticate the legitimacy
of an RFID tag, and evaluated the number of logic gates for
the implementation of cryptographic operations. Bogdanov et
al. [21] discussed compact hashing operations on RFID tags
and estimated the number of logic gates for implementation.
They also discussed the implementation of PRESENT-80 as an
ultra-lightweight block cipher [13]. However, there are only a
few papers addressing protocols or operations that have been
implemented on real C1G2 tags or emulators, mainly due
to that currently there are only a few of tag emulators that
are programmable and allow to run different cryptographic
operations. A remarkable work of implementation is done
by Fu’s research group [22] with WISP tags [23] which is
another tag emulator besides DemoTags we are using. They
implemented RC5 [24] on WISP tags based on which they
gave measurements of computation and symmetric cryptog-
raphy. Another work by Fu’s group implemented on WISP
tags is reported by [25] in which they proposed a framework
and gave a measurement for energy management in CRFIDs
(computational RFIDs).
As for reader/tag authentication protocols, there are many
of them that have been proposed for reader and tag authentica-
tions. Based on the application environments, some protocols
only fulfill one-way authentications [4], [5], [17], i.e., either
tags authenticate to readers or the reverse, while some other
4There is a claim from some providers of tag emulators that the relative time
cost of software implementation is comparable to hardware implementation
though, so far there is not any report claiming that software implementation
is two or more times faster than hardware implementation.
protocols fulfill mutual authentications (see, e.g., [6], [7], [14],
[20], [26]), i.e., both readers and tags authenticate to each other
mutually, leading to different time costs for carrying out the
protocols.
To prevent unauthorised readers from accessing legitimate
tags, Weis et al. proposed the hash-locking protocol [17] which
enables a tag to authenticate the legitimacy of a reader first
before allowing the reader to access the tag’s memory. Under
this protocol, if a challenge sent from a reader is a function of
the secret key held by a tag, then this reader is accepted by the
tag and allowed to access the tag’s memory; otherwise, it is
rejected by the tag. In real applications, this type of protocols
only takes a very small portion of all reader/tag authentication
protocols.
In most applications, readers are guaranteed legitimate but
tags could be counterfeit. Thus some protocols have been
proposed to prevent unauthorised tags from being accepted
by readers. The major difference amongst these protocols is
how a response is generated. One of the representatives of such
protocols is Tsudik’s YA-TRAP [4]. With YA-TRAP protocol,
a response from a tag is a hashing result of the secret key
held by the tag and the challenge sent from a reader. Upon
receiving the response, the reader transfers it to the back-
end server together with the challenge. The server runs the
same hashing operation with the challenge and each secret
key in its database, and compares the results so as to verify
the legitimacy of the tag. Feldhofer et al. [5] implemented
such a protocol under which a response is generated with AES
algorithm. Vajda and Buttya´n [19] proposed five protocols of
challenge-response with different ways of response generating
for a tag to authenticate itself to a reader. Henrici and Mu¨ller
[26] proposed a protocol to authenticate tags which at the same
time can preserve the privacy of tags’ locations.
In some circumstances tags may suffer from attacks coming
from counterfeit readers, and it is necessary for a reader and a
tag to mutually authenticate to each other. Mutual authentica-
tions are combinations of the above one-way authentications
with two possible orders, i.e., either a reader first authenticates
itself to a tag [6], [14] or the reverse [7], [8], [20], [27]. Alo-
mair et al. [6] proposed a mutual authentication protocol which
they claimed unconditionally secure. The protocol only used
primitive operations (i.e., bitwise XOR operations, modular
multiplication and addition) on tags so as to achieve low-cost
computations. Peris-Lopez et al. proposed M2AP protocol [14]
which contains only two rounds of conversation between a
reader and a tag and uses primitive operations. They claimed
it as the minimalist mutual-authentication protocol for low-
cost RFID tags, and studied the security property that Yang
et al. analysed for their protocol proposed in [20]. Other
properties such as time complexity and privacy-preserving of
lightweight protocols have been studied in [7], [8], [27].
V. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, we have made the following contributions
in the paper: (1) we have identified three major components
of the time cost for carrying out an authentication protocol,
(2) we have conducted comprehensive experiments to test the
time cost for running cryptographic operations and the time
cost for data exchange between a reader and a tag based on
IAIK UHF tag emulators and CAEN readers, (3) with the
benchmarks of time costs coming out from our experiments,
we have given a classification for the existing authentication
protocols and summarised a time cost formula for each type
of the protocols, and (4) from the experimental results and
the formulae, we have concluded that in most cases the time
cost of data exchange completely dominates the total time
cost of running a protocol. Our research results can serve as
a fair comparison reference for evaluating the time cost of an
authentication protocol.
For the next stage of study, it would be interesting to extend
our experiments to asymmetric cryptographic systems such as
ECC and RSA, and to carry out the experiments on WISP tags.
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